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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 19-1515 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KAPRI DRAYTON, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 3:18-cr-00529-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2019 
_____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 21, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Kapri Drayton pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  At sentencing, Drayton’s U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
calculation was undisputed:  101 to 111 months.  He asked for a downward variance, 
arguing for a sentence of 80 months of imprisonment.  He was sentenced to 110 months 
of imprisonment — one month below the top of his Guidelines range.  Drayton now 
appeals that sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Generally, we review both the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, given that Drayton failed 
to object to procedural reasonableness at sentencing, we review his procedural claims for 
plain error.  See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en 
banc).  “The plain error test requires (1) an error; (2) that is clear or obvious[;] and (3) 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights . . . .”  United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 
F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).  If these requirements are met, 
we will exercise our discretion to correct the forfeited error if it “seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Molina-
Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)). 
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II. 
 Drayton argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the 
District Court did not sufficiently explain its sentencing decision.  Specifically, Drayton 
contends that the District Court merely listed the mitigating and aggravating evidence but 
failed to explain “how the evidence was weighed in relation to” the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors.  Drayton Br. 15.  This argument fails.   
In sentencing a defendant, district courts must “acknowledge and respond to any 
properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual 
basis.”  Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256.  But how a district court does that is a matter of 
“professional judgment.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  “Sometimes 
the circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a lengthier 
explanation.”  Id. at 357. 
 After properly calculating Drayton’s Guidelines range and asking if the parties had 
any departure motions, the District Court considered Drayton’s variance motion.  
Appendix (“App.”) 255–56.  In so doing, the District Court explicitly and thoroughly 
considered the circumstances and nature of Drayton’s crime; his medical history, 
including his ADHD diagnosis and substance use and abuse; the extent of his criminal 
history; his gambling issues; his upbringing and family situation; and his work history.  
App. 267–74.  The District Court recognized Drayton’s “limited social support,” his 
exposure to “trauma, violence, and death” as a child, and his “significant history of 
behavioral dysfunction, substance abuse, difficulties in interpersonal relationships, 
coupled with having a great portion of adolescence and youth incarcerated.”  App. 270. 
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The District Court, however, also acknowledged the crime’s “horrific” and 
“violent” nature, as well as the need for deterrence and to protect the public.  App. 271–
72.  The record thus contradicts Drayton’s contention that the District Court failed to take 
into account Drayton’s “extensive mitigation package” because it “failed to explain how 
it weighed and why it rejected the substantial mitigation evidence.”  Drayton Br. 12, 17.  
The record does not indicate that the District Court failed to consider Drayton’s 
arguments, but rather, that it found these arguments to be “insufficient to warrant a 
sentence lower than the Guidelines range.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 358.  We conclude, 
therefore, that Drayton’s sentence was procedurally reasonable, and we see no error, let 
alone plain error. 
 Drayton next argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his 
sentence of 110 months is greater than necessary to fulfill the goals of sentencing.  This 
argument also fails.  In evaluating substantive reasonableness, we consider “whether the 
record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc)).  And “we will affirm [the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.”  Id.  
 As stated above, the District Court considered the mitigating evidence that 
Drayton presented.  The District Court also explained, however, that it was “extremely 
moved by the videotape [of the crime] which depicted a horrific scene, a violent scene.”  
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App. 271.  It described Drayton’s role in the offense, that he had “brandished a semi-
automatic handgun, [and] ordered the employees and the customers to the ground,” 
causing at least one victim to experience ongoing troubles as a result of the robbery, 
including “nightmares” and social anxiety.  App. 271–72.  The District Court recognized 
Drayton’s criminal history, including “terroristic threats” and simple assault, and that 
“[f]ollowing his release and parole, [he] continued his unlawful ways by committing this 
offense.”  App. 273.   
The District Court carefully weighed the seriousness and circumstances of 
Drayton’s crime along with his upbringing, family history, criminal history, and medical 
history.  It also explained the need to further “general and specific deterrence to protect 
the public from individuals such as [Drayton].”  App. 272.  And “[l]ooking at the totality 
of the circumstances” and considering the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court 
determined that a 110-month imprisonment term –– a within-Guidelines range sentence 
— was warranted.  App. 274.  Considering the record as a whole, Drayton’s sentence was 
within the range of reasonable sentences, and we cannot conclude that “no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence.  
 
